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I. INTRODUCTIONI N 1958, THE FEDERAL Aviation Agency came into existence
with the passage of the Federal Aviation Act.2 It charged the
newly minted agency to provide for the "regulation of air com-
merce in such manner as to best promote its development and
safety and fulfill the requirements of national defense," for the
"promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronau-
tics," and for "safety in air commerce."' With the formation of
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1967, the
agency became part of a larger transportation effort and gained
its current name of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)."
Fast forward twenty years to the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978.6 This act, inter alia, ended the FAA's regulation of routes,
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731; see THERESA L.
KRAUS, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,
1903-2008, at 9 (2008) (detailing the history of the FAA); A Brief History of the
Federal Aviation Administration, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (FAA), http://www.faa.gov/
about/history/brief history (last updated Feb. 1, 2010).
3 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 72 Stat. at 740.
4 Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 3(e) (1), 80 Stat.
931, 932 (1966).
5 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
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fares, and new entrants.' It did not end the balancing act of the
FAA; if anything, it added another layer because the FAA cannot
control where airlines choose to fly, what airlines charge for a
ticket, or whether a new entrant seeks to enter the market.' It is
clear that the Airline Deregulation Act benefited passengers by
reducing ticket prices and introducing new routes.8 These ben-
efits did not come without costs, however. In markets with high
demand, growth began to exceed capacity.
In 1996, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1996,1 which amended the FAA's mission by remov-
ing the promotion of air commerce."o This amendment made
the promotion of safety the FAA's principal interest." Although
this change removed the inherent conflict in the FAA's mission
of both promoting the industry and regulating it for safety, the
amendment continues to constrain the FAA's ability to balance
the industry's interests apart from the primary focus on safety.
This change in mission also reflects an acknowledgment that the
aviation industry has reached maturity and no longer needs the
FAA's protection.
In November 2001, Congress created the Transportation Se-
curity Administration (TSA) as part of the DOT in response to
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.12 After the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security was created in November 2002, the
TSA was transferred to that department.1 3 As a result of these
actions, the FAA ceased to have the responsibility or authority to
6 Id.; U.S. GOV'T AccouNTABILIwr OFFIcE, GAO-06-630, AIRLINE DEREGULATION:
REREGULATING THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY WOULD LIKELY REVERSE CONSUMER BENEFITS
AND NOT SAVE AIRLINE PENSIONS 1, 3 (2006) [hereinafter AIRLINE
DEREGULATION].
7 AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 6, at 9.
8 Id. at 18 ("Airfares have fallen in real terms over time, with round-trip me-
dian fares almost 40 percent lower since 1980.").
9 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat.
3213.
1o Id. § 401, 110 Stat. at 3255. In contrast, Congress did not revoke the FAA's
mission to promote commercial space launches and reentries, indicating that the
relatively immature industry of commercial space transportation required sup-
port from the federal government. 49 U.S.C. § 70103 (2006).
1I See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 § 401(a) (1), 110 Stat. at
3255.
12 Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Proce-
dures for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,586, 41,588 (July 19, 2005) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 1520, 1540, 1562).
13 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,195, 76,197 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 93).
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identify and assess security threats.1 4 However, the FAA retains
the authority to promulgate regulations that respond to security
concerns. 15
In 2003, Congress passed the FAA's latest reauthorization act,
known as Vision 100-A Century of Aviation Reauthorization
Act (Vision 100)." Vision 100 extended funding for FAA pro-
grams until 2007.17 Currently, the FAA is operating under a
temporary extension of the reauthorization." The Act rein-
forced the FAA's role in improving airports by continuing to au-
thorize grants through the Airport Improvement Program
(AIP), in maintaining and improving the airspace by focusing
on the use of new technologies (NextGen), and in enhancing
the safety and security of the aviation system."
Today, the FAA has a primary mission to promote safety in air
commerce. 0 Additionally, the FAA has exclusive authority over
U.S. airspace, also known as the National Airspace System
(NAS).2 In regulating the NAS, the FAA's mission is to ensure
the efficient use of the airspace and the safety of aircraft within
it,2 2 as well as to ensure "a safe and efficient nationwide system
of public-use airports" through grants for airport improvement
projects.23 In carrying out these missions, the FAA promulgates
regulations, prosecutes enforcement actions to ensure compli-
ance with those regulations, assigns and manages the use of air-
14 Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Safety Procedures
for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 41,588.
15 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 76,197.
16 Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176,
117 Stat. 2490 (2003).
17 Id. § 101, 117 Stat. at 2494.
IS Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2010, Part III, Pub. L. No. 111-249, § 5,
124 Stat. 2627, 2628 (extending reauthorization through December 31, 2010).
19 Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act §§ 144-66, 710; see also
Statement on Signing the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act,
2 PUB. PAPERS 1716, 1716 (Dec. 12, 2003) ("The Act is designed to strengthen
America's aviation sector, provide needed authority to the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), and enhance the safety of the traveling public.").
20 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d) (1) (2006) (prescribing the matters in the public inter-
est that the Administrator shall consider including "assigning, maintaining, and
enhancing safety and security as the highest priorities in air commerce").
21 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a).
22 Id. § 40103(b).
2s 49 U.S.C. § 47104(a); see generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 47101-75 (prescribing the
requirements for the Airport Improvement Program (AIP)).
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space, and facilitates airport planning and development
through its grant program.2 4
Whenever the FAA acts to carry out its missions, it is faced
with an array of competing public priorities, stakeholder inter-
ests, and long-term considerations that complicate its actions.
These actions also impact multiple stakeholders who often have
interests that conflict with other stakeholders. Occasionally, an
individual stakeholder may have multiple interests that compete
with each other. Also, the FAA must consider how the conse-
quences of today's action will play out five, ten, or twenty years
down the road.
Balancing competing interests in an effort to reach a decision
that is in the public interest is the proper role of government.
However, the process of balancing competing interests is not a
precise scientific exercise but can be a complicated and messy
affair. The FAA rarely has the opportunity to please all stake-
holders. Instead, in most cases, it has to find ways to minimize
the burden on each stakeholder while achieving a solution that
ultimately it determines is in everyone's best interest.
Over the past decade, the FAA has faced many situations that
illustrate this balancing process. The following discussion fo-
cuses on four of these situations: (1) managing airspace and im-
proving efficiency through the New York, New Jersey, and
Philadelphia Metropolitan Area Airspace Redesign (Airspace
Redesign); (2) reducing congestion and delay through manag-
ing slots25 at LaGuardia (LGA), John F. Kennedy International
(JFK), and Newark Liberty International Airports (EWR); (3)
protecting national security through the Washington, D.C. Spe-
cial Flight Rules Area (DC SFRA); and (4) enforcing aviation
safety regulations. The DC SFRA is the only issue of the four
that is essentially resolved. 6 The FAA continues to address the
competing interests with respect to the Airspace Redesign, and
with the rescission of the congestion management final rules on
October 9, 2009, the FAA currently is pursuing a long-term solu-
24 What We Do, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/activities/ (last up-
dated Mar. 10, 2005).
25 A slot is "the operational authority assigned by the FAA to a carrier to con-
duct one scheduled operation or a series of scheduled operations at" LGA, JFK,
or EWR "on a particular day(s) of the week during a specific 30-minute period."
14 C.F.R. § 93.36 (2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134 (Oct. 9, 2009)) (de-
fining "slot" for LGA); 14 C.F.R. § 93.162 (2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg.
52,134 (Oct. 9, 2009)) (defining "slot" for JFK and EWR).
26 See infra Part IV.
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tion for the New York area.2 7 Additionally, because the FAA
must balance a variety of competing interests on an individual-
ized basis each time it pursues an enforcement action, this issue
is never resolved. Each of these scenarios will address different
aspects of how the FAA identifies the stakeholders and their in-
terests, how it faces the challenge of balancing those interests
with its primary interests in safety and efficiency, and how it con-
siders the long-term implications of its actions.
II. NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, AND PHILADELPHIA
AIRSPACE REDESIGN
The FAA's Airspace Redesign in the greater New York, New
Jersey, and Philadelphia areas is illustrative of the challenges the
agency faces when it undertakes large-scale changes to flight
paths. This airspace was designed in the 1960s-before the
double digit growth of air travel, the emergence of EWR, Phila-
delphia International Airport (PHL), and Teterboro as major
airports, and changes to fleet mix and schedules, to name just a
few major developments.28 The FAA must find a way to update
the use of this airspace to ease today's congestion and accommo-
date future growth.2 9 Yet, this growth in air travel has had side
effects on communities near the major airports as more flights
zoom over homes, businesses, and schools. This is and will con-
tinue to be an arena of tension and controversy with local com-
munities' interests pushing up against the national interest of
ensuring a safe, efficient, and reliable air system.
A. DELAYED FLIGHTS
A business passenger begins his day by boarding an early
flight at Bradley International Airport outside Hartford, Con-
necticut, on a turboprop aircraft headed into JFK. His connect-
ing flight to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) has a
scheduled departure time of 10:30 a.m., arriving at about 2:00
27 See Congestion Management Rule forJohn F. Kennedy International Airport
and Newark Liberty International Airport, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134, 52,134 (Oct. 9,
2009) (to be codified as 14 C.F.R. pt. 93); Congestion Management Rule for La-
Guardia Airport, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132, 52,132 (Oct. 9, 2009) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 93).
28 FAA, RECORD OF DECISION: NEW YORK/NEWJERSEY/PHILADELPHIA METROPOL-






p.m. PST. This will give the traveler time to prepare for an im-
portant meeting the next day.
The morning push of departures from JFK began shortly after
8:00 a.m. There has been the usual level of traffic and some
minor weather. By 10:00 a.m., departure delays exceed thirty
minutes for points west. As aircraft line up, waiting to taxi out
or take off, the airport pavement and gates become saturated,
leaving little room for arriving aircraft. En route to JFK, the pi-
lot on our traveler's flight informs the passengers that they have
been placed in a holding pattern. Finally, at approximately
10:00 a.m., forty-five minutes after the scheduled arrival time,
his flight lands. 0 The traveler rushes to his connecting flight
only to find that its departure is delayed by at least another fifty
minutes.
Regular travelers through the three major airports servicing
New York City know this scenario all too well." The point of
this scenario is not to evoke angst but to begin a dialogue about
the connectivity of actions in the NAS, the impact the airports in
the greater New York area have on the NAS, and the role the
FAA plays in maintaining a safe and efficient navigable airspace.
B. BACKGROUND
In 2007, 22,816,687 passengers flew in and out of JFK3 2 Ap-
proximately 15,606,000 passengers flew in and out of PHL the
same year.3 3 All of these passengers, of course, occupy aircraft
operating in the airspace. To view this commerce from an air
traffic perspective, one must examine the volume of aircraft
handled by air traffic control facilities. There are three types of
facilities: the Air Traffic Control Tower (Tower), the Terminal
Radar Approach Control (TRACON), and the Air Route Traffic
Control Center (Center). 34 The New York Air Route Traffic
30 At JFK, this pattern repeats itself in the early afternoon as international
flights begin to arrive from the Caribbean, Europe, and South America and pre-
pare to leave again for international destinations.
31 Id.
32 FAA, TERMINAL AREA FORECAST SUMMARY: FISCAL YEARS 2008-2025, at 9
(2009), available at http://www.faa.gov/data-research/aviation/taLreports/me-
dia/TAF%20Summary%20Report%20FY%202008-2025.pdf.
3 Id.
34 FAA, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: NEW YoRK/NEw JERSEY/
PHILADELPHIA METROPOLITAN AREA AIRSPACE REDESIGN ch. 1, at 5, 11 (2007)
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Control Center (ZNY) is one of twenty Centers in the United
States.3 5 It controls most aircraft entering, exiting, and over-
flying the New York region and plays a role in controlling traffic
entering and exiting the Philadelphia region. 6 This Center
handled approximately 3,056,000 aircraft in 2007, second only
to Atlanta Center. This level of operation represents a nearly
fifty-percent increase in traffic levels as compared to the last dec-
ade.I Traffic in this region is expected to continue to grow.
By 2011, it is estimated that fifteen to twenty percent of all air
traffic in the United States will move through the greater New
York area.40
These statistics demonstrate that the airspace above New York,
New Jersey, and Philadelphia is some of the busiest airspace in
the country." These cities also have some of the most complex
airspace with five major, sixteen satellite, and numerous general
aviation airports vying for space among the growing number of
aircraft traversing in and out of the airspace.4 2 This leads to
congestion and delays.4 3 The airports in this area are consist-
ently some of the most delayed in the country. In 2007, the year
the FAA issued its final agency decision to move forward with
the Airspace Redesign,44 LGA had the worst on-time arrivals in
the country with only fifty-eight percent of its flights arriving
within fifteen minutes of scheduled arrival time. 4 5 It was fol-
3 Id.
36 Id. Centers manage all aircraft operating under Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR). Id. ch. 1, at 5. Part of the traffic departing and arriving into the Philadel-
phia region is handled by the Washington Center. Id. ch. 1, at 12.
37 FAA, ADMINISTRATOR'S FACT BOOK 9 (2008) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATOR'S
FACT BOOK], available at http://www.faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquarters_of-
fices/aba/adminfactbook/media/200811.pdf. The numbers in the fact book
are rounded, but exact numbers for aircraft handled by the Centers, TRACONS,
and towers can be found at www.aspm.faa.gov.
38 FINAL EIS, supra note 34, ch. 1, at 11.
39 Id.
- ROD, supra note 28, at 10.
41 Id. For a real-time visual representation of traffic in this area, see Airport
Monitor 2.0, John F. Kennedy International Airport, http://www4.passur.com/
jfk.html. Similar information is available for EWR (http://www4.passur.com/
ewr.html), LGA (http://www4.passur.com/Iga.html), and PHL (http://www4.
passur.com/phl.html).
42 FINAL EIS, supra note 34, ch. 1, at 13-14.
4 ROD, supra note 28, at 3.
Id. at 1.
45 Table 4: Ranking of Major Airport On-Time Arrival Perfomance Year-to-Date
Through December 2007, RES. & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., http://www.bts.gov/
programs/airline information/airlineontimetables/2007_12/html/table_04.
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lowed by EWR, JFK, Chicago O'Hare, and PHL.46 Delays in
these areas have ripple effects as far away as Chicago, Atlanta,
and even the West Coast.47
In 1998, the FAA began a process to redesign the New York,
NewJersey, and Philadelphia airspace.4 8 The focus was to iden-
tify ways to safely enhance efficiencies in the airspace to accom-
modate current and future growth.4 9 This redesign covers the
largest geographic area undertaken to date with over 31,000
square miles."o In this project, the FAA takes advantage of new
technologies such as satellite-based navigation."1 This project
fully integrates the airspace to reduce complexities in opera-
tions and to expand the use of terminal separation rules that
allow aircraft to be separated by three nautical miles instead of
five.52
C. STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR INTERESTS
The Airspace Redesign is an ideal case study for discussing the
various stakeholders, their interests, and the challenges of fulfil-
ling the FAA's statutory mission among the competing interests.
One of the first and most obvious stakeholders in this project is
the flying public. Passengers expect and deserve safe, reliable,
and dependable air service. Whether traveling for leisure or
business, passengers also have an interest in delay reduction. 4
Delays cost money, plain and simple. 5 To the passenger, this
occurs primarily because of the costs associated with the addi-
tional time it takes to get from point A to point B.56
html (last visited Sept. 12, 2010). For 2007, EWR had an on-time arrival rate of
59.45%, JFK had 62.84%, and PHL had 66.54%. Id.
46 Id.
47 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-786, FAA AIRSPACE REDE-
SIGN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK/NEW JERSEY/PHILADELPHIA PROJECT 1-2
(2008) [hereinafter FAA AIRSPACE REDESIGN].
48 Press Release, FAA, Fact Sheet-Redesign of the New York, New Jersey, and
Philadelphia Airspace (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/
newsstory.cfm?newsId=9472.
49 FAA AIRSPACE REDESIGN, supra note 47, at 1.
50 See ROD, supra note 28, at 24.
51 See id. at 3.
52 Id. at 1.
53 Id. at 8.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 10. Enhancing efficiencies is estimated to save airlines, passengers,
and businesses seven to nine billion dollars. Id.
56 See id. at 8.
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Another stakeholder, although not in the traditional sense, is
the environment. The FAA must examine what type of impacts
(both positive and negative) its proposed actions will have on
noise,5 7 air quality,58 environmental justice populations,'5 9 and
parklands.o Overall, New York Airspace Redesign reduces noise
to over 600,000 individuals, reduces emissions, and results in a
delay savings of up to twenty percent compared with taking no
action." With mitigation, when the project is complete, there
will be no significant impacts to environmental justice popula-
tions, national, state, or local parks, or any other resources."
Local residents, both close-in and those over forty miles away
from the major airports, have a keen interest in this project and
represent another stakeholder. 3 Most residents focus on noise,
perceived safety threats, and air pollution.6 4 Some are already
bothered by aircraft flying overhead and want to curtail the
number of aircraft that fly over their homes.6 Some complain
about noise even though their economic vitality depends on the
air service provided by these major metropolitan airports. 6 The
interests of these individuals bothered by aircraft noise fre-
quently compete with the interests of maintaining an efficient
airspace, something that benefits the overall population. 7 In
this region, there are millions of verbally energetic people who
57 See FAA, ORDER 1050.1E, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING ENvi-
RONMENTAL IMPACTS, app. a, at A-1 (June 8, 2004) [hereinafter FAA ORDER
1050.1E] (defining a significant noise increase as an increase of 1.5 decibel (dB)
DNL (day-night average sound level) or more over noise sensitive areas within
the 65 dB DNL).
58 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006).
59 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629, 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
60 See 49 U.S.C. § 303b-c (2006). There are other categories of environmental
impacts that must be addressed by the FAA but are usually not impacted by
changes to the airspace. See FAA ORDER 1050.1E, supra note 57, app. a, at A-1.
61 ROD, supra note 28, at 1.
62 Id. at 28-32, 38-41.
63 See Establishment of New Part 150 to Govern the Development and Submis-
sion of Airport Operator's Noise Compatibility Planning Programs, 46 Fed. Reg.
8,316, 8,324-26 (Jan. 26, 1981) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 150) (discussing
the interests of residents living near airports).
64 See ROD, supra note 28, at 50-54.
65 Id. at 10.
66 In Delaware, No Relieffrom Plane Noise: Options for Airspace Redesign Not Likely to
Quiet Complaints, NEWS J., May 14, 2006, at Al (discussing the difficulty in weigh-
ing economic benefits against residents' concerns).
67 Establishment of New Part 150 to Govern the Development and Submission
of Airport Operator's Noise Compatibility Planning Program, 46 Fed. Reg. at
8,324-25.
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live within ten to fifteen miles of an airport.' Short of halting
services or moving the airports, there is not much that can be
done to eliminate noise to these residents." Other, far more
numerous but less vocal, local residents reap the benefits of liv-
ing near major metropolitan airports.7 0 Those residents are fre-
quent travelers and appreciate the convenience, schedule, and
fares that come with living in a region with multiple airports and
carriers, or they are business people and employees who benefit
from the economic activity brought by the very same airports.
Noise is a challenging impact for the FAA to manage. Here,
the Airspace Redesign project results in a net reduction in noise
to communities in the 31,000 square miles within the Airspace
Redesign.7 1 Still, within this net reduction, there are some com-
munities that will receive noise increases of five or more deci-
bels.73 These increases are all in low noise levels as measured by
federal standards.7 4 More telling, when Airspace Redesign is
complete, there are no "significant" noise increases as measured
by the FAA's standards. Yet, the individuals and communities
with noise increases will seize upon this increase, even at low
levels, as a means to contest the redesign.
Congested airspace over heavily populated areas adds to the
complexity and demonstrates how competing interests can be
interrelated. 7 Reducing noise for one population means in-
creasing noise for another. The FAA, as a policy matter, will not
68 ROD, supra note 28, at 10.
9 This being said, it is interesting to note that aircraft have become quieter
over the last two decades as the result of improved technology and the gradual
phase-out of Stage 2 aircraft. FAA, EVALUATION OF NOISE SET ASIDE PORTION OF
THE AIRPORT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 2-3 (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://
www.faa.gov/airports/aip/guidance-letters/media/PGL_03-02.Attachment_A.
doc; ROD, supra note 28, at 2.
70 See, e.g., John Flink, County Chamber Backs O'Hare Plan, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29,
2001, at L1.
71 Id.
72 ROD, supra note 28, at 24-27.
73 Id. at 25-26.
74 Noise Exposure Tables, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/air-traffic/nas-redesign/re-
gional-guidance/eastern-reg/nynjphl-redesign/documentation/noise expo-
sure-tables/media/NewJersey/NJ.Bergen.xls (last visited Dec. 23, 2009). For
example, in census block 1008 in Bergen County, New Jersey, 286 residents re-
ceive an increase of noise from 36.9 dB DNL to 41.3 dB DNL. Id. Measured
against other common sources of noise, 30 decibels is similar to a soft whisper
and 45 decibels is similar to distant bird calls.
75 FAA ORDER 1050.1E, supra note 57, app. a, at A-61; ROD, supra note 28, at
25-27.
76 See ROD, supra note 28, at 10.
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shift similar noise levels from one populated area to another
solely for noise abatement purposes. 7 The FAA's primary focus
in redesigning airspace and procedures remains operational ef-
ficiency and safety.78 In this project, the FAA was able to modify
certain procedures to mitigate noise while maintaining opera-
tional efficiency.79 One such modification involves departure
procedures at PHL.so The FAA developed departure dispersal
headings for the parallel runways."' Multiple departure head-
ings allow more aircraft to depart in a given hour.8 2 The num-
ber of departure headings for Runway 9/27 was reduced to
mitigate noise and the headings were modified to align more
closely with the river, industrial areas, and a major interstate.
This is an example of one way the FAA was able to consider and
minimize the impact on some stakeholders.
Similar to the flying public, the airlines are a stakeholder in
this project. Delays associated with airspace congestion cost the
airlines millions.8 4 Increased efficiencies reduce fuel costs and
help make the airlines more profitable.8 ' The costs to airlines
are directly and indirectly passed onto the general public."
Delays cost the American people money. Congress has an
interest in reducing this cost and ensuring that the NAS works
safely and efficiently. Congressional representatives of the local
communities may have different interests. They are mainly con-
cerned with the well being of their constituents. Many receive
numerous noise complaints from their constituents and believe
the trade-off for these projects is not worth the noise (even
though there is a net noise decrease). For example, residents of
NewJersey receive noise from aircraft departing out of PHL and
JFK88 The residents may feel this is an unfair burden because
the airports are serving other states. Unfortunately, this is the
reality of such a densely populated area.
77 FINAL EIS, supra note 34, ch. 1, at 25.
78 ROD, supra note 28, at 9-10.
79 Id. at 1.
80 FINAL EIS, supra note 34, ch. 5, at 23.
81 Id. ch. 5, at 23.
82 Id. ch. 2, at 62.
83 Id. ch. 5, at 24.




88 See ROD, supra note 28, at 2.
89 Id. at 10.
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The airports in the region, another stakeholder, also have an
interest in efficiency."o Many of the airports in this region are
"pavement constrained" and thus have limited options for in-
creasing capacity.91 If changes to procedures can improve the
number of arrivals and departures in an hour, stated as increas-
ing "throughput," then the airports benefit." This region is also
faced with a unique challenge that comes from having major
airports within close physical proximity, having similar runway
configurations, and using common routes over water"-routes
that help lower noise impacts.94
Finally, but not last in importance, state and local govern-
ments are key stakeholders. They, like the FAA, may have com-
peting interests. Airports, airlines, and air travelers generate tax
revenue, support the local hospitality industry, and create jobs
for local residents." Yet, residents complain about the negative
impact that air traffic has on their quality of life and claim that it
devalues their homes." Aircraft noise may impact their ability
to sit in backyards or enjoy a park. On the other hand, close
proximity to the airport can increase the value of homes, thus
increasing the tax base.97 This area is highly subjective. How
state and local governments and individuals value an airport var-
ies widely.
D. CONTROVERSY AND SCRUTINY
The project is not without controversy. It has been the focus
of congressional inquiries, legislative amendments to halt the
9o Many of the airports are owned directly by the localities or through a spe-
cially created airport or port authority.
91 FAA, CAPACITY NEEDS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 2007-2025, at 6
(May 2007), available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/publications/re-
ports/media/fact_2.pdf.
92 See FAA AIRSPACE REDESIGN, supra note 47, at 79 n.36.
93 See FINAL EIS, supra note 34, ch. 1, at 21-25.
94 Id. pt. ES, at fig.1.
95 John L. Pipes, Foreward to FAA, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVIL AVIATION ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY 3 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/office
org/headquarters offices/ato/media/2008_EconomicImpactReport~web.pdf.
96 See, e.g., Daniel P. McMillen, Airport Expansions and Property Values: The Case of
Chicago O'Hare Airport, 55 J. URB. ECON. 627, 627-28 (2004).
97 Id. at 628.
98 Press Release, Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg, Lautenberg, Menendez, Andrews
Call for FAA to Halt Airspace Redesign Plan (Mar. 25, 2008), available at http://
lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=295086&&.
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project temporarily or permanently," an investigation by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO),100 and litigation.10 1
In the summer of 2007, the GAO advised the FAA that it was
initiating an investigation of the Airspace Redesign based on a
request by Chairman Jerry Costello, Representative Rob An-
drews, and Representative Joe Sestak.on The GAO continued
this investigation even after lawsuits were filed.o' This was very
unusual because the GAO, as a matter of policy, normally does
not investigate matters that are the subject of ongoing litiga-
tion.104 On August 29, 2008, the GAO released its final report
concluding that "applying these [National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) ] requirements and the APA's reasonableness stan-
dard ... [the] FAA complied with applicable NEPA and related
requirements and environmental justice directives." 05
On September 5, 2007, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b), the
FAA issued its final agency action approving a full scale redesign
and integration of the airspace. 06 This type of agency order is
subject to review in the "United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the
United States for the circuit in which the person resides or has
its principal place of business."' Thirteen lawsuits were filed
against the project in three judicial circuits and one district
court.1 08 In all, the lawsuits named seventy-three petitioners and
alleged violations of NEPA,1o' the U.S. Department of Transpor-
99 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, H. Amend. 369 to H.R. 3288,
111th Cong. (proposing to restrict all funding for the Airspace Redesign Project).
The amendment was rejected on July 23, 2009. Bill Summary & Status, THOMAS,
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.111hamdt369 (last visited Nov. 2,
2010).
100 FAA AIRSPACE REDESIGN, supra note 47, at 2.
10 Id. at 2.
102 Id. at 1.
103 Id.
104 U.S. Gov'T AccouNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-310G, GAO's CONGRESSIONAL
PROTOCOLS 4, 10 (2004).
105 FAA AIRSPACE REDESIGN, supra note 47, at 5.
106 See ROD, supra note 28, at 58 (comprising the final agency decision). The
Administrator of the FAA "shall develop plans and policy for the use of the navi-
gable airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary
to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace." 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(b) (1) (2006).
107 49 U.S.C. §46110(a).
108 City of Rockland v. FAA, No. 07-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2008) (order con-
solidating twelve cases).
109 City of Rockland v. FAA, 335 Fed. App'x 52, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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tation Act Section 4(f),o11 and the Clean Air Act (CAA). 1 1 Many
of the named petitioners were local municipalities or interest
groups.'1 2 On June 10, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit issued a favorable opinion that dis-
missed or otherwise disposed of all claims against the FAA's Re-
cord of Decision (ROD) for the New York/New Jersey/
Philadelphia Metropolitan Area Airspace Redesign Project. 1 3
The Court held that the FAA's environmental impact statement
(EIS) was "procedurally sound and substantively reasonable." 14
Two groups petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari. 1 5 On January 16, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the
petitions, thus concluding this litigation. 16
The FAA is continuing to implement this important yet con-
troversial project:
Anyone who's driven on a dirt road knows that it's hard to find a
smooth dirt road. No matter where you are, those bumps pop up
like a washboard. But one thing is indisputable, though, and
that is the more heavily traveled the road, the bigger the
bumps....
As you know, this Administration wants to get rid of any bumps
on the path to air traffic modernization. 17
When implementation of this airspace redesign is complete,
there will be delay reduction of up to twenty percent-a substan-
tial step towards smoothing out the bumps.'
III. CONGESTION MANAGEMENT AT NEW
YORK AIRPORTS
As discussed with respect to airspace redesign, the FAA is
working to address congestion and delays at the three major
New York airports: JFK, EWR, and LGA. The problem at these
11o Id. at 55.
In Id. at 56.
112 City of Rockland v. FAA, No. 07-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2008) (order grant-
ing motion to consolidate and listing lead petitioners).
n1 County of Rockland, 335 Fed. App'x at 57.
114 Id. at 53.
115 County of Delaware, Pa. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 130 S.Ct. 1168 (2010);
County of Rockland, N.Y. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 130 S.Ct. 1168 (2010).
16 Id.
117 J. Randolph Babbitt, FAA Administrator, Bumps in the Road, Remarks to
the International Aviation Club (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.faa.gov/
news/speeches/news-story.cfm?newsld=10883.
118 Press Release, supra note 48.
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airports is simple to state in economic terms: demand exceeds
supply. However, the solution is anything but simple because of
the variety of stakeholders and their competing interests. The
FAA must consider each of these competing interests as it works




Because of its proximity to midtown Manhattan and the re-
sulting high demand by travelers to New York City, LGA consist-
ently has been one of the nation's most congested airports."'
Exacerbating the high passenger demand, the airspace and air-
field capacity of the airport are limited because the airspace is
constrained by two other major airports in the area (JFK and
EWR),12o and there is no place to build an additional runway
without extending the airport into Bowery or Flushing Bays,
which is cost- and environmental-consequence-prohibitive. 2 '
Beginning in 1969, the FAA managed congestion and delays
at LGA through the High Density Rule (HDR).122 The HDR re-
stricted take offs and landings at LGA during certain hours by
allocating slots. 1 2 3 Prior to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
airlines agreed to the reservation allocations made through air-
line scheduling committees. 124 Following deregulation, new en-
trants formed and began operating at LGA, and legacy carriers
increased their operations; consequently, the scheduling com-
mittees deadlocked as competition for limited resources in-
creased.125 Responding to these new problems, the DOT
promulgated a new subpart S to part 93 in 1985 to replace the
119 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,360,
51,361 (proposed Aug. 29, 2006) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct. 9,
2010)).
120 See id.
121 See id. at 51,363.
122 Id. The HDR for LGA was codified in 14 C.F.R. part 93, subpart K; though
this subpart and subpart S still exist, they no longer are effective for LGA. See
infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
123 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. at
51,363; see also supra note 25 (defining "slot").





scheduling committees with use-or-lose provisions and permis-
sion to operate a secondary market for slots. 126
In 2000, Congress enacted the Wendell H. Ford Aviation In-
vestment and Reform Act of the 21st Century (AIR-21)1 2 7 to
phase out the HDR and terminate it at LGA on January 1,
2007.128 AIR-21 also directed the Secretary of Transportation to
grant exemptions from the HDR's slot limits to new entrants
and operations that served small communities.12 1 Congress rec-
ognized that this legislation could increase congestion and de-
lays at the airport and accordingly preserved the FAA's authority
for safety and movement of air traffic despite the phase-out of
the HDR.so
By the fall of 2000, air carriers were operating over 300 new
scheduled flights at LGA and had plans to operate more.' 3 ' The
average delay at the airport increased 144% from 15.52 minutes
in March 2000 to 37.86 minutes in September 2000.182 Delays
spread across the nation because an aircraft departing late from
LGA would affect the schedule for that aircraft by delaying its
subsequent flights, and these delays build upon each other.1 3 3
By September 2000, flight delays at LGA soared to twenty-five
percent of the nation's delays from ten percent the previous
year.134
To provide relief from the increasing delays, the FAA capped
scheduled operations at seventy-five per hour and unscheduled
operations at six per hour, and it conducted a lottery to allocate
the slot exemptions."' These caps reduced delays at LGA from
126 Id. (referencing High Density Traffic Airports; Slot Allocation and Transfer
Methods, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180 (Dec. 20, 1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 11,
13)).
127 Id. (citing Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the
21st Century, Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000) (codified in scattered sec-








1s5 Id. (citing High Density Airports; Notice of Lottery of Slot Exemptions at
LaGuardia Airport, 65 Fed. Reg. 75,765 (Dec. 4, 2000)). The lottery was con-
ducted on December 4, 2000, and the operation limitations began on January 31,
2001. Id.
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330 aircraft delays daily in October 2000 to ninety-eight daily
aircraft delays in April 2001.3'
Based on this empirical data, the FAA determined that simply
allowing the HDR to expire, as contemplated by AIR-21, was not
an option.1 3 7 The FAA would have to implement some sort of
administrative scheme to address congestion.' The FAA real-
ized that it would not be able to implement a permanent con-
gestion management solution for LGA before the January 1,
2007, expiration of the HDR."1 3  Accordingly, it promulgated a
temporary order retaining the caps for scheduled operations at
seventy-five per hour and for unscheduled operations at six per
hour.14 0 In August 2008, the FAA amended the order by de-
creasing the cap for unscheduled operations to three per
hour.'4 1 In January 2009, the FAA amended the order by de-
creasing the cap for scheduled operations to seventy-one per
hour, but all current operations above that cap were
grandfathered unless an airline voluntarily surrendered its slot
allocation.1 4 2 This temporary order remains in effect, at least,
through October 29, 2011.143
During the summer of 2007, flight delays nationally were the
second worst on record. 1 4 4 As a result of the crippling delays,
the Secretary of Transportation formed the New York Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (NY ARC) to explore options for ad-
dressing congestion and delays at the three New York airports
136 Id.
137 See Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia Airport; Notice of Order,
71 Fed. Reg. 77, 854 (Dec. 27, 2006) (discussing consequences of allowing HDR
to expire and using those consequences as justification for temporary limits is-




141 Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia Airport; Notice of Order, 73
Fed. Reg. 48,428 (Aug. 19, 2008).
142 Operating Limitations at New York's LaGuardia Airport; Notice of Order,
74 Fed. Reg. 2,646 (Jan. 15, 2009).
143 Operating Limitations at LaGuardia Airport; Notice of Order, 74 Fed. Reg.
51,653 (Oct. 7, 2009).
- Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,846,




and to obtain input from the major stakeholders." The NY
ARC provided its recommendations in December 2007.146
The FAA promulgated a final rule in October 2008 with an
effective date of December 9, 2008.147 That rule was rescinded
on October 9, 2009, before it became effective. 4 8 Because only
the order is currently in place, the FAA has initiated a rulemak-
ing project to implement a long-term congestion management
solution for LGA.
2. John F. Kennedy International Airport
Like LGA, JFK has high passenger demand and constrained
airspace and runway capacity.' There is no reasonable means
of adding a runway because the airport is boxed in by Jamaica
Bay and high-density residential areas on all sides.1 50 Also, as at
LGA, the FAA managed congestion at JFK from 1969 through
2006 through the HDR."' In 1994, Congress granted the Secre-
tary of Transportation authority to grant exemptions from the
HDR to new entrants. 15 2 The DOT exercised this authority in
1999 by granting seventy-five slot exemptions to JetBlue Airways
(JetBlue), with the condition thatJetBlue would operate the ma-
jority of its flights outside the slot-controlled hours."5 ' AIR-21
set a termination date ofJanuary 1, 2007, for the HDR atJFK15 4
145 Id. The ARC had members from every major U.S. air carrier, foreign carri-
ers, passenger groups, and the Port Authority of New York and NewJersey. Con-
gestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,574, 60,576
(Oct. 10, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
146 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
20,847. A copy of the final ARC Report may be found at http://www.faa.gov/
library/reports/media/NY%20ARC%2OFinal%20Report.pdf.
147 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
60,574.
148 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132,
52,132 (Oct. 9, 2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93). The rule had never
become effective because it was stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit due to pending litigation. Id.
149 See P'SHIP FOR N.Y. CiY, GROUNDED: THE HIGH COST OF AIRPORT CONGES-
TION 7 (Feb. 2009), available at http://pfnyc.org/reports/20090225_airport
congestion.pdf.
150 See id.
151 Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy International Airport
and Newark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,626, 29,626 (proposed
May 21, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134 (Oct. 9, 2009)).




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Historically, JFK operated primarily as an international gate-
way, with flights concentrated in afternoon and evening arrival
and departure banks consisting of international flights and of
domestic connecting flights that supported those international
flights.15 5 Beginning in the spring of 2006, airlines dramatically
increased domestic operations atJFK throughout the day.15 6 Be-
cause of this increase in operations during the summer of 2007,
demand exceeded airport capacity in many periods of the day,
resulting in congestion and delays.' 5 7 The average daily opera-
tions increased twenty-one percent from 2006 to 2007, and the
on-time performance metrics precipitously declined.'5 8 As for
LGA, delays at JFK cascaded throughout the nation.1 59
In January 2008, the FAA promulgated a temporary order cap-
ping scheduled operations at eighty-one per hour to assist with
the summer 2008 scheduling season.o6 0 The temporary order
remains in effect, at least, through October 29, 2011, as the FAA
formulates a permanent solution.1 6 '
The FAA promulgated a final rule in October 2008 with an
effective date of December 9, 2008.162 That rule was rescinded
on October 9, 2009, before it became effective.165 Because only
the order is currently in place, the FAA has initiated a rulemak-
ing project to implement a long-term congestion management
solution for JFK





16o Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at John F. Kennedy International
Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 3,510, 3,516 (Jan. 18, 2008).
161 Order Extending and Modifying the Limitations on Scheduled Operations
atJohn F. Kennedy International Airport, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,650, 51,650 (Oct. 7,
2009).
162 Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy Airport and Newark
Liberty International Airport; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,544, 60,544 (Oct. 10,
2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
163 Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy International Airport
and Newark Liberty International Airport, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134, 52,134 (Oct. 9,
2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93). The 2008 rule never became effective
because it was stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit due to pending litigation. Id.
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3. Newark Liberty International Airport
Like LGA and JFK, EWR has high passenger demand and con-
strained airspace and runway capacity.' EWR is bound by the
Port of Newark and high-density commercial and residential ar-
eas, limiting its ability to expand runways.' Also, like the other
two major New York airports, EWR had initially been subject to
the HDR, but the rule was suspended because it had sufficient
capacity to support demand.16 6 However, by 2007, EWR became
the second worst airport for on-time performance as demand
exceeded capacity.1 7
In May 2008, the FAA promulgated a temporary order cap-
ping scheduled operations at eighty-one per hour.16 " As opera-
tions were capped at LGA and JFK, the airlines could relocate
their operations to EWR. Therefore, EWR required caps to bal-
ance the overall congestion of the three New York airports. The
temporary order remains in effect, at least, through October 29,
2011.169
The FAA promulgated a final rule in October 2008 with an
effective date of December 9, 2008.170 That rule was rescinded
on October 9, 2009, before it became effective."' Because only
the order is currently in place, the FAA has initiated a rulemak-
164 See P'SHIP FOR N.Y. CrrY, supra note 149, at 7.
165 See id.
166 High Density Traffic Airports, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,591, 16,592 (Oct. 24, 1970)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
167 Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy International Airport
and Newark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,626, 29,628 (proposed
May 21, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
16 Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at Newark Liberty International Air-
port, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,550, 29,554 (May 21, 2008).
169 Order Extending and Modifying the Limitations on Scheduled Operations
at Newark Liberty International Airport, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,648, 51,648 (Oct. 7,
2009).
170 Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy International Airport
and Newark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,544, 60,544 (Oct. 10,
2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
171 Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy International Airport
and Newark Liberty International Airport, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134, 52,134-35 (Oct.
9, 2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93). The rule had never become effective
because it was stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit due to pending litigation. Id. Following the rescission of the final rules,
all cases pending in the Court of Appeals were dismissed by stipulation. Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. FAA, No. 08-1329, 2009 WL 3568661, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
14, 2009) (dismissing petition as moot) (consolidated with Nos. 08-1331, 08-1332,
08-1333, 08-1343, 08-1344, 08-1355, and 08-1371).
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ing project to implement a long-term congestion management
solution for EWR.
B. STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR INTERESTS
Congestion management is a complicated problem that is
compounded by the variety of stakeholders and their competing
interests. Some of the stakeholders have multiple interests that
conflict with each other. The stakeholders include airlines,
commercial operators, the traveling public, the airport opera-
tor, and other governmental entities.
A major stakeholder in the issue of congestion management is
the Secretary of Transportation, who must consider a variety of
public interest objectives in addition to airspace efficiency.17 2
These objectives include the following:
Keeping available a variety of adequate, economic, efficient, and
low-priced air services; placing maximum reliance on competitive
market forces and on actual and potential competition; avoiding
airline industry conditions that would tend to allow at least one
air carrier unreasonably to increase prices, reduce services, or ex-
clude competition in air transportation; encouraging, develop-
ing, and maintaining an air transportation system relying on
actual and potential competition; encouraging entry into air
transportation markets by new and existing air carriers and the
continued strengthening of small air carriers to ensure a more
effective and competitive airline industry; maintaining a com-
plete and convenient system of scheduled air transportation for
small communities; ensuring that consumers in all regions of the
United States, including those in small communities and rural
and remote areas, have access to affordable, regularly scheduled
air service; and acting consistently with obligations of the U.S.
Government under international agreements. 73
The DOT works with the FAA on an ongoing basis to determine
whether proposed FAA solutions adequately address these pol-
icy concerns.174
An airline's principal interest is maximizing profitability. An
airline can maximize revenue by flying operations in the largest
172 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 71 Fed. Reg.
51,360, 51,363 (proposed Aug. 29, 2006) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct.
9, 2009)).
17 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a) (4), (6), (10)-(13), (16), 40105(b)
(2006)).
174 See, e.g., id. at 51,361-63 (illustrating specific ways in which the DOT had
worked with the FAA to address these concerns at LGA).
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aircraft that it can fill because the cost to operate a large aircraft
is the lowest on a seat per mile basis.17 5 This is why long-haul
international flights generally are most profitable.1 7 ' Although
airlines can achieve the lowest per-unit cost by flying a small
number of flights with large aircraft, airlines have an equal or
greater interest in market presence and schedule utility. 7 7 For
example, flying one flight in a Boeing 747 per day from New
York to Chicago may be the best choice from a purely per-unit
cost standpoint, but an airline would not be able consistently to
fill that flight because passengers do not want to wait around for
that one daily flight. Passengers, especially those on relatively
short-haul flights, want to fly when it is convenient for them.
Therefore, it is in the airline's interest to run multiple (some-
times hourly) New York-to-Chicago flights. As a result of this
pressure to maximize passengers' choices, on April 19, 2005,
there were sixteen LaGuardia-to-Baltimore flights, forty-four La-
Guardia-to-Raleigh-Durham flights, and twenty LaGuardia-to-
Philadelphia flights.17 8 All of these flights were conducted in
aircraft with an average seat capacity below sixty.1 7 9 The large
number of small flights decreases the through-put of the airport
and leads to congestion and delays.18 0 In economic terms, the
market is inefficiently allocating resources.
Airlines also have made significant investments in their cur-
rent operations at airports based on their existing slots.' 1 For
example, some airlines own their own gates at the three major
New York airports.18 2 Additionally, airlines have spent unknown
amounts of capital establishing their routes and market pres-
ence.'" They have an interest in protecting these investments
175 See Steven A. Morrison, The Evolution of Competition Since Deregulation, in IN-
DUSTRY STUDIES 147, 151 (Larry L. Duetsch ed., 2d ed. 1998).
176 See id. at 150-53 (discussing which flights are most profitable).
177 See, e.g., Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 51,362-63 (demonstrating how, in the absence of restrictions, airlines will in-
crease flights without restraint).
178 Id. at 51,364.
179 Id. The average seat capacities for Baltimore (large hub) was thirty-eight,
for Raleigh-Durham (medium hub) fifty, and for Philadelphia (large hub) fifty-
eight. Id.
180 See id.
181 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
60,574, 60,588 (Oct. 10, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
182 Id. (discussing ownership of slots).
183 Id.
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from regulatory action that could decrease market share and
from competitors that seek to gain market share. 18 4
Additionally, airlines have a significant interest in minimizing
delays, which is interrelated with their interest in maximizing
market presence.' Delays always translate into increased costs
or missed revenue opportunities.1 8 6 Excessive delays also affect
customer behavior, which in turn can affect market share. 18 7
For example, some passengers avoid connections at the three
major New York airports to decrease the likelihood that they will
suffer delayed or canceled flights."88 As stated earlier, delays
cost airlines millions of dollars every year. 1 8
Airlines generally support a cap on operations because they
understand the consequences of congestion and delay, but they
are concerned about any market manipulation by the FAA or
the DOT.190 Airlines prefer the grandfathering of slot alloca-
tions held below the caps because holding all existing slots al-
lows them to maintain their operations at an airport."' Airlines
are nervous about a withdrawal of slots to reach the caps be-
cause of its impact on market share.'9 2 Further, the loss of any
slots by existing operators could result in termination of impor-
tant feeder flights into a hub airport, which may negatively im-
pact service to small markets.19 3 Any sort of withdrawal of slots
below the caps for reallocation to potential new entrants (i.e.,
competitors) would run counter to the existing operators' eco-
nomic interests. 9 4
184 See id. at 60,591 (detailing practices that carriers might employ to maintain
market share).
185 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg.
20,846, 20,849 (proposed Apr. 17, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct.
9, 2009)).
186 P'SHIP FOR N.Y. CITY, supra note 149, at 7; see, e.g., Annual and Per-Minute Cost
of Delays to U.S. Airlines, AIR TRANsp. Ass'N., http://www.airlines.org/Economics/
DataAnalysis/Pages/CostofDelays.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
187 See Annika Mengisen, Adjust Your Flight Plan to Avoid Airport Delays, THE
STREET (Aug. 22, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10375670/
4/adjust-your-flight-plan-to-avoid-airport-delays.html (discussing ways consumers
may change their behavior due to recurring delays).
188 See id.
189 See sources cited supra note 186.
190 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
20,847.
191 See id. at 20,854 (discussing benefits of grandfathering slot allocations).
192 See id. at 20,849.
193 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,574,




Smaller commercial operators and other general aviation op-
erators have an interest in access to an airport.1 9 5 A slot alloca-
tion scheme that shuts out unscheduled operations is
unacceptable to these operators.19 ' Unlike airlines, which plan
their schedules months in advance, unscheduled operators
often have no more than an hour or two notice before an opera-
tion.' If a slot is unavailable at that time, the operator may
suffer economic consequences from not conducting the flight.
Business aviation and all-cargo operators are most affected be-
cause of the nature of their business models." Unscheduled
operators and other general aviation operators also do not see
the connection between their relatively small utilization of any
of the airports and the general congestion and delays at those
airports."' They believe the large carriers are responsible for
the congestion and delay problems, and they contend the same
carriers should bear the burden of fixing the problem.2 00 These
operators often do not have the option to operate from other
smaller regional airports (such as Westchester, Islip, Republic,
Stewart, Morristown, or Teterboro) because of the operating
constraints of the aircraft they use or because they have signifi-
cant infrastructure investments at larger airports.2 0 1
Passengers, generally supported by passenger advocacy
groups, have interrelated interests like the carriers. 0 Passen-
gers primarily want the lowest fares possible, which is provided
195 See id. at 60,591-92.
196 See id. at 60,591.
197 Operating Limitations for Unscheduled Operations atJohn F. Kennedy In-
ternational Airport and Newark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed. Reg.
54,658, 54,659 (Oct. 30, 2008).
198 Id.
199 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
60,591; see also Operating Limitations for Unscheduled Operations at John F.
Kennedy International Airport and Newark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed.
Reg. at 54,659 ("The National Air Carrier Association (NACA) contends that the
proposed order unfairly targets a segment of the industry, unscheduled opera-
tions, that does not contribute significantly to the capacity constraints at the
airports.").
200 See, e.g., Reservation System for Unscheduled Arrivals at Chicago's O'Hare
International Airport, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,610, 39,610 (July 8, 2005) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93) (summarizing the viewpoints of unscheduled operators at
O'Hare in response to a similar ruling).
201 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
60,592.
202 See id. at 60,576, 60,594.
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by intense competition between the airlines.2 0 s Passengers also
want a variety of options so that air travel fits their schedules
rather than the other way around.20 4 For example, business trav-
elers prefer to travel early in the morning and in the evening to
allow the maximum number of working hours at the destina-
tion. Despite this interest in choice, which generates a large
number of flights increasing the potential for congestion, pas-
sengers want to travel without delays. 2 0 5 Delays for passengers
translates into missed business opportunities, unnecessary ex-
pense, and lost leisure time.2 0 6
Another group of stakeholders includes "[fiederal, state and
local government representatives who [are] concerned the
FAA's proposal, if adopted, would result in specific communities
losing direct service" to any or all of the major New York air-
ports.2 07 New York City also has an interest in efficient air ser-
vice to the city because its local economy is heavily dependent
on travelers to the area. 0 s It does not want service cut from
communities that feed its engine of commerce.2 0 9
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Author-
ity), which manages all three major New York airports, has an
interest in efficient operations at the airports and in its ability to
manage its property.21 0 Its biggest concern about regulatory ac-
tion is that a regulation would disrupt the operations of airlines
at the airports.2 1 1 Each airport is configured in such a way to
support its existing operations.2 1 2 If there were a major change
in those operations (for example, widespread turnover of gate
203 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg.
20,846, 20,852 (proposed Apr. 17, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct.
9, 2009)).
204 See id. at 20,849 (discussing how airlines use multiple daily flights on smaller
aircraft to accommodate market preferences).
205 See Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,318, 32,331
(June 8, 2010) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 244, 250, 253, 259, 399)
(discussing importance to passengers of notifications regarding delays).
206 Daniel R. Polsby, Airport Pricing of Aircraft Takeoff and Landing Slots: An Eco-
nomic Critique of Federal Regulatory Policy, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 779, 785 (2001).
207 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
20,847.
208 P'SHIP FOR N.Y. CITY, supra note 149, at 35.
2o9 Id.
210 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
60,574, 60,593 (Oct. 10, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
211 See id.
212 See, e.g., Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 20,851 (discussing limitations of LGA's physical capacity).
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assignments), the Port Authority may not be able to guarantee
efficient service at the airports or may have to make a large eco-
nomic investment to guarantee that service. 2 1s Airport opera-
tors also have limited resources to address congestion problems
alone. 1 Most airports, and especially the three major New York
airports discussed earlier, are constrained from adding addi-
tional runways to increase airport capacity.215
C. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
The large number of stakeholders and their interrelated in-
terests complicate the FAA's role in developing a permanent so-
lution to the congestion problem. For example, airlines'
interest in maximizing market presence through a large number
of flights is interrelated with their interest in minimizing delays.
However, the former often works against the latter, and often, as
seen during the summer of 2007, with disastrous conse-
quences.21 6 Airlines often do not recognize these interests are
interrelated because delays are an externality of airline opera-
tions. Delays negatively impact airlines and, to a greater extent,
the flying public, but increased market presence benefits only
airlines. Regulation by the FAA has the potential to internalize
these externalities and encourage airlines to reduce operations
to reduce delays.
The FAA could walk away from trying to manage congestion
and delays at these airports and allow the airlines to manage
their schedules.2 1 7 Under this strategy, the FAA could ensure
safety despite increased air traffic through its "[a]ir traffic con-
trol procedures and traffic management initiatives such as
ground delay programs, miles-in-trail restrictions, and aircraft
re-routing." 218 However, unfettered growth at the airports and
the resulting congestion and delays detrimentally impacts the
rest of the NAS." Moreover, the FAA has responsibility for the
efficient utilization of airspace, which means that the FAA must
address local congestion and delays that affect the entire sys-
213 See id. at 20,850-51.
214 See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.A.
215 CAPACTIY NEEDS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM, supra note 91, at 6.
216 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. at
20,847.
217 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,360,
51,362-63 (Aug. 29, 2006) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
218 Id. at 51,363.
219 Id.
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tern. 22 0 The FAA also has an interest in developing a long-term
solution that provides certainty in the market and flexibility to
deal with increased capacity gained from long-term projects,
such as the Airspace Redesign or NextGen."'
The FAA's primary goal is to manage congestion and delays
by limiting the number of permitted operations at the three
New York airports.2 2 2 However, the FAA is looking for a solution
that does not stifle service to small communities or eliminate
opportunities for new entrants.2 2 3 New entrants may be neces-
sary to maintain competition at an airport.2 24 The FAA wants to
encourage airlines to use the scarce number of slots in the most
efficient way.22 5 Ultimately, the FAA must find
a balance between (1) promoting competition and permitting ac-
cess to new entrants and (2) recognizing historical investments in
the airport and the need to provide continuity. It is not the role
of the Government either to dictate particular business models
or to constrain a market and provide no means for others to
enter that limited market.226
Finding this balance is particularly challenging for the FAA be-
cause it must contend with competing political viewpoints on
the role of government, and the decisions with respect to these
broad policies determine the FAA's ultimate solution.2 2 7 One of
these viewpoints is that nurturing new entrants is in the public
interest and justifies market engineering.228 This viewpoint
could lead to the agency seeking reallocation of slots in some
fashion to facilitate new entrants or to reshape otherwise the
competitive landscape at a slot-controlled airport.2 Another
viewpoint is that government should merely enable and facili-
tate the operation of the market.23 0 This viewpoint would tend
220 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (1) (2006).
221 See ROD, supra note 28, at 1 (describing the long-term gain to be achieved
from the Airspace Redesign Project).
222 See Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia Airport; Notice of Order,
71 Fed. Reg. 77,854, 77,854 (Dec. 27, 2006).
223 See id. at 77,858-59.
224 See Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg.
20,846, 20,852 (proposed Apr. 17, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct.
9, 2009)).
225 See id. at 20,846.
226 Id.
227 See, e.g., id. at 20,851 (discussing competing interests posed by two airlines'
viewpoints).
228 See id. at 20,852.
229 See id. at 20,850-51.
230 See id. at 20,847, 20,850-51.
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to focus on establishing an efficient market for slots with govern-
ment oversight largely limited to maintaining a cap on opera-
tions, which would allow competitors to preserve and manage
the valuation of their assets.2 3 1
The FAA recognizes that one method of allocating slots would
be to withdraw all currently-held slots and then reallocate them
using some method that guarantees fairness and trans-
parency.232 However, that method ignores the significant invest-
ments airlines have made in their existing slot allocations.
Therefore, if the FAA were to move in that direction, it should
consider some allocation method that grandfathers some por-
tion of those slot allocations while still meeting its other policy
goals. Grandfathering could "preserve service to communities"
presently served by an airport and "minimizes disruption at the
airport and to the traveling public."2 3 4 The FAA faces a chal-
lenge of determining where to draw the line and which interest
(either the expectation of incumbency or the need for slot mo-
bility) should be given a higher priority in rulemaking. 23 5 There
is a delicate balance between a withdrawal of slots so large that it
stifles investment in service at the airport and a reallocation so
small that it shuts out new entrants from the airport.236 Any
withdrawal of slots also should be done over a period of time to
minimize impact on airport operations.
The FAA recognizes a robust secondary market for slots is a
good way for the market to allocate a scarce resource. 3 A ro-
bust secondary market ensures that a traded slot ends up with
the airline that values it most.2 8 A new entrant wishing to pro-
vide service at an airport could acquire slots on this market, as
could airlines seeking to expand service. 239 Airlines seeking to
reduce service could use the market to recover some investment
231 See id.
232 See Congestion Management Rule for John F. Kennedy International Air-
port and Newark Liberty International Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,544, 60,547 (Oct.
10, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,134 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
233 See id. at 60,555-56 (discussing the FAA's regard for investments and its
desire to respect them).
234 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,360,
51,365 (Aug. 29, 2006) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
235 See id. (describing different aspects of the rule that highlight this
challenge).
236 See id. (demonstrating the FAA's sensitivity to this balance).
237 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,574,
60,574, 60,587 (Oct. 10, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct. 9, 2009)).
238 Id. at 60,577, 60,587.
239 See id. at 60,580.
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costs. A robust secondary market can be undermined when slot
allocations are made outside of that market.
The FAA previously proposed a two-part bulletin board auc-
tion where the first round was blind and limited to a cash offer,
followed by a second round that allowed the direct negotiation
between known parties over non-cash assets.240 The FAA deter-
mined that this type of auction would ensure fairness and effi-
ciency because it would allow all potential bidders to
participate. 24 1 Following an auction, the FAA proposed a re-
quirement for the parties to submit a detailed report of the ac-
cepted bid and all rejected bids to the DOT to ensure that the
parties did not engage in anticompetitive behavior.2 4 2 Portions
of this information could be publicly disclosed, thereby allowing
all airlines to value accurately slots for that market. 24 3
Any permanent solution also should consider strict use-or-lose
requirements, which encourage an airline either to maximize
usage of its slot allocations or to dispose of those slots on the
secondary market.24 4 High utilization could be achieved by set-
ting a high usage requirement, such as eighty or ninety percent
over a sixty- or ninety-day period, or by a requirement that a slot
allocation be tied to a specific scheduled operation.2 4 5 Under
the current orders, an airline can report flight cancellations
under multiple slot allocations to meet the usage require-
ments. 246 "For example, four flights could be distributed over
five [slots] and each [slot] would meet the eighty percent usage
requirement." 24 7 Regardless of whether this action is taken for
anticompetitive reasons, underutilizing slot allocations prevents
the most efficient usage of an airport.24 8
Any permanent solution should consider unscheduled opera-
tions and include those operations in the total operational lim-
its. 2 4 9 However, the caps should not stifle all unscheduled
240 Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,846,
20,857 (proposed Apr. 17, 2008) (rescinded by 74 Fed. Reg. 52,132 (Oct. 9,
2009)).
241 See id. at 20,856-57.
242 Id. at 20,857.
243 Id.




248 See id. at 20,849.
249 See id. at 20,857.
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operations at the airport nor sacrifice scheduled service, which
provides greater throughput of passengers.
A permanent solution also should treat all New York airports
as one system. If similar actions are not taken at all airports,
then operators will relocate their operations to get around con-
gestion management requirements.2 5 0 This permanent solution
also may require investigating unscheduled operations at
smaller New York area airports, like Westchester, Islip, Republic,
Stewart, Morristown, and Teterboro, because all of these air-
ports share the same congested airspace.
Finally, a permanent solution should consider the long-term
implications of rulemaking. The FAA currently is undertaking
general initiatives to increase airspace efficiency, such as the Air-
space Redesign and NextGen. 2 51 Additionally, accurate esti-
mates of future demand are speculative because of the large
number of variables.25 2 Accordingly, any permanent solution
should be flexible enough to adapt to changed circumstances
without returning to the problems of the past or future underu-
tilization of capacity.
As the FAA works toward a solution to the congestion man-
agement problem at the three major New York airports, it
should consider and balance these competing interests. Ulti-
mately, the long-term solution should operate in the public's
best interest, but getting to that solution is a complicated
undertaking.
IV. WASHINGTON, D.C. SPECIAL FLIGHT RULES AREA
The Washington, D.C. Special Flight Rules Area (DC SFRA)
final rule and other rulemaking activities leading up to it pro-
vide an excellent example of the FAA balancing its special prior-
ity of safety and the government's general priority of security
with the stakeholder's interest in freedom of transit in the air-
space. The FAA considered the interests of, and frequent oppo-
sition from, various stakeholders affected by its rulemakings.2 5 3
The FAA labored for more than seven years to craft a perma-
25o Operating Limitations at New York LaGuardia Airport; Notice of Order, 73
Fed. Reg. 48,428, 48,429 (Aug. 19, 2008) (discussing impact of implementing
unscheduled operating rules uniformly).
251 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
252 See, e.g., Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 20,851 (describing how previous caps have made future demand hard to
judge).
253 See infra Part IV.B.
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nent solution that considered these competing interests and at-
tempted to impose minimal burdens on all stakeholders while
achieving the critical priority of security. 254
A. BACKGROUND
Before September 11, 2001, the majority of airspace in the
Washington, D.C. National Capital Region (NCR) was open to
all aircraft under the General Operating and Flight Rules under
14 C.F.R. part 91.255 Because of the volume of traffic and the
number of airports in the NCR, a portion of the area was desig-
nated as Class B airspace, which requires clearance from air traf-
fic control before operating an aircraft within the airspace. 6
Additionally, for national security purposes, the FAA designated
prohibited areas for aircraft operations under 14 C.F.R. part 73
around the White House, the U.S. Capitol building, and the
U.S. Naval Observatory (the office and residence of the Vice
President).257
On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, American
Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World
Trade Center in New York City,2 58 United Airlines Flight 175
crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center,5
American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon,2 10 and
United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a field near Shanksville,
254 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,195, 76,196 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 93).
255 Id. at 76,196.
256 Id.; see generally 14 C.F.R. § 91.131 (2010) (prescribing operating rules for
Class B airspace).
257 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 76,196.
258 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIS-
SION REPORT 7 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/
911Report.pdf. All eighty-one passengers and eleven crewmembers as well as an
unknown number of people in the building were killed instantly. Id. The build-
ing subsequently collapsed, causing additional loss of life. FED. EMERGENCY
MGMT. AGENCY, WORLD TRADE CENTER BUILDING PERFORMANCE STUDY: DATA Co-
LECTION, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS, ch. 1, at 4 (2002),
available at http://www.fema.gov/rebuild/mat/wtcstudy.shtm.
259 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 258, at 8.
All fifty-six passengers, nine crewmembers, and an unknown number of people in
the building were killed instantly. Id. The building subsequently collapsed, caus-
ing additional loss of life. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT., supra note 258, ch. 1, at 4.
260 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 258, at 10.
All fifty-eight passengers, six crewmembers, and several people on the ground at




Pennsylvania.6 It is widely believed that either the U.S. Capitol
or White House in Washington, D.C. was the target of the ter-
rorists who gained control of Flight 93.262 This was the first time
terrorists had used a hijacked U.S. aircraft as a weapon of at-
tack.263 Because of this novel form of attack and the risks to
high-value targets in the NCR, the U.S. government scrambled
to protect these targets from future attack. 6
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the FAA took steps to ensure that the NAS was secure
from immediate terrorist attacks. 6 5 It implemented a tempo-
rary prohibition on all aircraft operations within the United
States, which was lifted in part on September 13, 2001.6 After
the system-wide restrictions were lifted, the FAA maintained
temporary restrictions on high-value target areas, including the
NCR.2 6 7 Using the U.S. Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) System,2 6 8
the FAA issued a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) prohibit-
ing all aircraft operations within a twenty-five-nautical-mile ra-
dius of the Washington, DC Very High Frequency
Omnidirectional Range / Distance Measuring Equipment (DCA
VOR/DME), which encompassed all of Washington, D.C. and
the surrounding areas in Maryland and Virginia. 2 6 9 This prohi-
261 Id. at 14.
262 Id
263 See id. at 17.
264 See id. at 41.
265 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,195, 76,196 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 93).
266 Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Proce-
dures for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,586, 41,587 (July 19, 2005) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 1520, 1540, 1562). Excepted from this general prohibi-
tion were "certain military, law enforcement, and emergency-related aircraft op-
erations." Id. The FAA implemented this prohibition through its authority to
regulate airspace in the interest of national defense. See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (3)
(2006).
267 Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Proce-
dures for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 41,587.
268 Id. The FAA uses NOTAMs to notify pilots of airspace restrictions among
other important aviation information. Id. at 41,587 n.1.
269 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 76,196; Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Pro-
cedures for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 41,587. The TFR extended from
the surface to 18,000 feet. Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight
Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,196. The DCA VOR/DME is located near DCA.
See Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Procedures
for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 41,587.
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bition effectively closed Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport (DCA). wo
On October 4, 2001, DCA was reopened to limited air carrier
operations subject to various security restrictions. 2 71 These re-
strictions were eased over the next several years as the security
vetting of the operators was judged to minimize the risks of fu-
ture attacks; however, general aviation operations remained es-
sentially non-existent at the airport because of the security
vetting requirements. 2 7 2 After the TSA was created in November
2001, it assumed civil aviation security functions including re-
sponsibility for the security of operations at DCA." In July
2005, the TSA issued an interim final rule to allow general avia-
tion operators to fly to and from DCA if those operators were
vetted by the TSA and if the aircraft flew from specified "gate-
way" airports where inspections could be conducted.2 7 4
In December 2001, the TFR area around Washington, D.C.
was reduced to a fifteen-nautical-mile radius around the DCA
VOR/DME." In February 2003, the FAA issued a NOTAM es-
tablishing the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area Air Defense
Identification Zone (DC ADIZ) and redesignating the previ-
ously identified fifteen-nautical-mile TFR area as the Washing-
ton, D.C. Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). 26
Within the DC ADIZ, the FAA prescribed flight plan filing re-
quirements as well as the use of radio communication with air
traffic control and the transmission of a discreet transponder
code (commonly known as "squawk and talk") for operations
under VFR.7
These temporary restrictions remained in place for the next
several years, and no major terrorist attacks occurred.2 7 8 Vari-
ous government agencies used this intervening time to investi-
gate a long-term solution for this airspace, including possibly
270 Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Proce-
dures for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 41,587.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 41,588.
274 Id.
275 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,195, 76,196 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 93).
276 Id. at 76,197.
277 Id.
278 See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed.
Reg. 45,250, 45,251 (proposed Aug. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
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lifting the flight restrictions.2" Because Washington, D.C. is the
seat of the federal government, the home to many foreign em-
bassies, and the location of many significant national monu-
ments, and because military and security agencies continued to
intercept intelligence regarding potential attacks, the FAA
sought to make airspace restrictions permanent to ensure secur-
ity in this area.so In August 2005, at the request of the Depart-
ments of Homeland Security and Defense, the FAA proposed a
rulemaking to formalize the DC ADIZ and FRZ.28 ' The FAA re-
ceived more than 21,000 written comments and many oral com-
ments submitted during four public meetings-most opposed
the proposal." A final rule was issued on December 16, 2008,
and became effective in February 2009.283
Under the final rule, the FRZ is essentially a circle with a fif-
teen-mile radius around the DCA VOR/DME, which encom-
passes all of Washington, D.C., the Pentagon, and the
immediate surrounding areas in Virginia and Maryland.28 4 No
aircraft operations are permitted within this area except for mili-
tary, law enforcement, essential services, and FAA-approved Part
121 operations.285 The DC SFRA is essentially a circle with a
thirty-mile radius around the DCA VOR/DME." 6 Aircraft oper-
ations within this area must have filed flight plans for the opera-
tion, must squawk a discreet code from a transponder, and must
be in contact with air traffic control.8
B. STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR INTERESTS
Because of the issues involved with restricting airspace in the
NCR, which is a heavily-trafficked area, there are a variety of
stakeholders whose interests must be considered. These stake-
holders include other government agencies, pilots and commer-
cial aviation operators,2 8 small airport operators, the traveling
279 See id.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 42,252.
282 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 76,198.
283 Id. at 76,195.
284 14 C.F.R. § 93.335.
285 Id. § 93.341.
286 Id. § 93.335.
287 Id. § 93.339.
2- See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed.
Reg. 45,250, 45,255-57 (proposed Aug. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
93).
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public, and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA).
Other government agencies are also major stakeholders re-
garding matters of national security. As discussed earlier, the
TSA assumed the responsibility for identifying and assessing se-
curity threats with respect to aviation, but the FAA retains au-
thority to promulgate regulations responding to security
concerns.2 8 9 On June 20, 2006, then-President George W. Bush
issued National Security Presidential Directive-16, Aviation Se-
curity Policy, which linked the DHS, the DOD, the DOT, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of State, the De-
partment of Energy, and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for the protection and security of the aviation sys-
tem.2 90 This interagency coordination provides a forum for the
FAA to prioritize and balance the security interests as they apply
to the NAS. 2 9 1 The FAA also works closely with the DHS, the
DOJ, and the Secretary of Defense (as well as the U.S. Northern
Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Com-
mand) to identify and evaluate aviation-related threats and to
facilitate a response to those threats.2 9 2 These agencies' primary
interest is to secure the airspace around the NCR to prevent avi-
ation-related terrorist attacks.29 3 The most effective means to
achieve this goal is to prohibit all air traffic in an area large
enough to allow countermeasures if a potentially hostile aircraft
entered that airspace. 29 4
Another major stakeholder is the diverse group of general avi-
ation pilots, business and commercial pilots, commercial opera-
tors, and air carriers.295 These stakeholders are burdened by the
procedures for operating within the DC SFRA and FRZ.2 96 Com-
mercial operators and carriers also suffer economic burdens as
they try to service their customers that desire to fly to and from
289 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
29o Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,195, 76,197 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 93).
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed.
Reg. 45,250, 45,252 (proposed Aug. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
294 Id. at 45,252.




the NCR."' They must equip aircraft to meet the requirements
for operating in the DC SFRA and often encounter delays when
operating there.m Often, they also must take actions to meet
the requirements of flying to or from their desired airport be-
cause of the security requirements for that airport.2 9 9 Indirectly,
the customers of these operators have an interest in the airspace
regulation in the NCR because their ability to access the NCR
easily is impacted by any flight restrictions. 0 0 The customers
may be limited in their choice of airports, which can add delays
to the overall trip because of additional commuting time.3 o' Ad-
ditionally, these stakeholders have another interest that is more
interrelated with the security interests of the federal govern-
ment than they realize: a future terrorist attack could cause even
greater damage to their businesses and quality of life in the
302
region.
Many commenters to the proposed DC SFRA rule, primarily
representing general aviation pilots in the Washington, D.C.
area, were concerned that the rule unfairly restricted their free-
dom of movement and right of transit in the airspace without an
adequate security justification; some went so far as to claim that
the restrictions "let the terrorists win."s0 This argument was
supplemented by the argument that general aviation pilots pose
little threat to security and that most aircraft used in general
aviation are not large enough to pose a threat.3 04
In the initial period following September 11, 2011, the
MWAA, which operates DCA, was a major stakeholder because it
297 See Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Proce-
dures for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,586, 41,587 (July 19, 2005) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 1520, 1540, 1562).
298 See id. at 41,590-91.
29 See, e.g., id. (detailing the additional requirements operators must meet to
obtain flight approval into DCA).
300 See, e.g., id. at 41,588 (requiring passengers to fly into DCA from certain
TSA approved airports).
301 See id.
302 See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed.
Reg. 45,250, 45,256 (proposed Aug. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
303 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,196, 76,198, 76,201 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 93).
These commenters rely on the explicit "public right of transit through the naviga-
ble airspace" in 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (2) (2006). However, that right is a limited
right subject to the FAA's determination of safety, security, and efficient use of
the airspace. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1)-(3).
304 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 76,201-02.
2010] 813
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
had been closed due to airspace restrictions."o' As its operations
were gradually restored with additional security requirements,
its interest in ongoing rulemakings decreased, provided that
these rulemakings did not re-impose strict prohibitions.so6 In
the intervening eight years, the airport has absorbed the costs
related to increased burdens into its normal operations.
Under the original temporary restrictions, there were a signif-
icant number of airports on the edge of the proposed DC SFRA
(commonly known as "fringe airports")."os Those airports had
an interest in a regulation that did not stifle their aviation traffic
because a pilot would be more likely to fly from an airport not
subject to the additional DC SFRA requirements than from one
subject to them. 0 In addition to the airports in the DC SFRA,
there are three airports within the FRZ: College Park Airport,
Potomac Airfield, and Washington Executive/Hyde Field Air-
port (collectively, "the Maryland Three").sxo Under the
NOTAMs issued immediately after September 11, 2001, all oper-
ations were prohibited at these airports.3 1 1 This prohibition
caused major economic hardships on the airports, which previ-
ously had about 89,000 operations per year before the restric-
tions, effectively driving them out of business. 1 SFAR 94,
issued in 2002, allowed some operations at the Maryland Three
to ameliorate the economic burdens.1 3 However, they had a
continuing interest that any final rule regulating this area did
not overly burden the airports or their operations."
305 See William Glanz, Officials Close Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
Indefinitely, WAS. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 8909425.
3o See Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Proce-
dures for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 41,587.
307 See id.
308 14 C.F.R. § 93.335 (2009). "Fringe airports" are airports located just within
the outer boundary of the DC SFRA, including Barnes (MD47), Flying M Farms
(MD77), Mountain Road (MD43), Robinson (MD14), and Skyview (51VA). Id.
3o See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed.
Reg. 45,250, 45,255 (proposed Aug. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93)
(noting that pilots are more likely to use fringe airports because they are not
subject to the additional restrictions).
310 Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain Airports in the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area Final Rule, 67 Fed.







C. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
During the rulemaking process, it was widely assumed that
other federal agencies had forced the FAA to make airspace de-
cisions that it otherwise would not have made. 15 The FAA is
obligated to regulate airspace in the interest of national security
and consult with the Secretary of Defense when promulgating
security regulations.3 16 This statutory mandate, along with other
federal initiatives, encourages coordination between federal
agencies on national security but leaves the final airspace deci-
sion to the FAA.3 1' The FAA coordinated with other federal
agencies but ultimately issued a final rule based upon its rea-
soned judgment. 18 Additionally, the FAA continues to work
with these agencies to determine when and what sort of action
must be taken on a temporary or permanent basis to address
security risks.'
In the rulemaking process, the FAA had to place top priority
on security issues, provided safety was not sacrificed, because the
stakes were too high to risk another terrorist attack.3 2 o There-
fore, the interests of the flying public and the business interests
of general aviation airport operators were subordinated. 2
Nevertheless, the FAA considered the interests of individuals
operating within the airspace and attempted to ease the burden
of those stakeholders.3 2 2 The FAA coordinated with the DOD
and DHS to ensure that the restricted areas (SFRA and FRZ)
were large enough to provide sufficient time to conduct coun-
termeasures to ensure the security of high-value targets if a po-
tentially hostile aircraft entered the airspace but not so large as
to burden needlessly the public. 2 The resulting DC SFRA was
reduced in size from that which was initially proposed. 24 The
FAA had reduced the size of the SFRA (then ADIZ) by NOTAM
in August 2007 to its current thirty-nautical-mile radius and
315 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,195, 76,198 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 93). That as-
sumption was refuted by the FAA in the preamble to the final rule. Id.
316 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (3) (2006).
3 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 76,197.
318 Id. at 76,198.
s1 Id. at 76,202.
320 See id. at 76,201.
321 Id.
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changed the shape to a circle."2 The modifications to the shape
of the SFRA were intended to make it easier for pilots to navi-
gate around the SFRA boundaries, thus reducing the likelihood
of inadvertent encroachments. The reduced size also facili-
tates pilots who wish to fly around the SFRA to avoid the addi-
tional requirements. 2 7  Additionally, the reduction in size
decreased the number of airports affected by flight restrictions
and increased the unrestricted airspace available for aircraft
operations."2
The FAA also implemented a flight plan filing requirement in
the DC SFRA to get information on who was flying in the
area.3 2 ' By balancing the burdens, the FAA determined that re-
quiring the filing of flight plans was the least intrusive method
of collecting this informations.33  This also allowed the DC
SFRA, which generally is open to all air traffic subject to the
squawk and talk requirements, essentially to constitute a buffer
zone around the high-value targets to provide additional re-
sponse time in the event of a terrorist attack.13 1 This flight plan
requirement, and resulting buffer zone, is less burdensome than
creating a larger FRZ, which was an option on the table. 3
Other alternatives considered and supported by various stake-
holders were: establishing a fifty-five-nautical-mile outer ring
and fifteen-nautical-mile inner ring; establishing a thirty-nauti-
cal-mile FRZ around the NCR; and establishing outer rings as
large as 110 nautical miles.' The stakeholders who advocated
these options heavily emphasized security, but the FAA deter-
mined they were not in the public interest when less restrictive
means were available. 3 3 4
The FAA attempted to accommodate the fringe airports as
well as the pilots operating to and from those airports. The FAA
developed specific egress-only procedures to allow aircraft to
325 Id. The August 2007 NOTAMs essentially maintained the dimensions of
the FRZ, except for some minor boundary modifications. Id.
326 See id.
327 See id. at 76,206.
328 Id.
32 Id. at 76,202.
3 Id. at 76,203.
33 Id.
332 Id. at 76,203-04.
333 Id.
4 See Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain Airports in the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area Final Rule, 67 Fed.
Reg. 7,538, 7,539 (Feb. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
816 [75
NAVIGATING THE TURBULENCE
take off at an airport on the edge of the SFRA, enter the SFRA
on takeoff, and quickly exit the SFRA without violating the
rules."' This accommodated fringe airports and allowed gen-
eral aviation pilots to continue to have a variety of airport op-
tions within the NCR.33 6 The FAA also implemented special
flight procedures for the Maryland Three to allow traffic to con-
tinue at those airports, and operators can continue to use those
airports if they first are vetted by TSA.33 1 Although those special
procedures are heavy burdens, the FAA chose those burdens
over totally prohibiting traffic at the airports, which had been an
option.3 3 8
The FAA also engaged in extensive educational outreach, in-
cluding a free online course, to inform pilots of the boundaries
of the FRZ and SFRA, the rules for operating within this air-
space, and the consequences of violating those rules." 9 Com-
pletion of this training is required for all pilots prior to
operating aircraft under VFR within a sixty-nautical-mile radius
of the DCA VOR/DME. 3 4 0 The goal of this outreach was to min-
imize the incidence of unintentional encroachments and their
attendant consequences.3 4 '
These concessions to the various stakeholders had to be bal-
anced against the FAA's primary mission of ensuring aviation
safety. 3 4 2 Because of this large carve-out of airspace, the FAA
assumed that many aircraft operators would choose to circum-
navigate the SFRA.se This circumnavigation could increase
congestion at the edges of the SFRA, increasing the potential for
an accident or incident.34 4 However, the FAA determined that
the volume of traffic should not create a safety issue.345 The
35S 14 C.F.R. § 93.345 (2009).
336 See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed.
Reg. at 76,202.
3' 14 C.F.R. § 93.343.
3 See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed.
Reg. at 76,203-04.
9 Id. at 76,204.
3o 14 C.F.R. § 91.61 (a).
34 See Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed.
Reg. 45,250, 45,253 (proposed Aug. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93);
see also Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed.
Reg. at 76,204.
-2 Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 76,198, 76,201.
3 Id. at 76,209.
- Id. at 76,204.
34 Id.
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FAA did take several actions to ensure safety within and around
the DC SFRA. 4 6 It changed some air traffic control procedures
within the area to mitigate air traffic controller workload and
facilitate air traffic separation in the area. The FAA also estab-
lished gates for entry and exit of the DC SFRA to reduce the
safety implications of too many aircraft congregating around
fixes waiting for the assignment of a discreet transponder code,
which is required for operating in the SFRA.34 8
In the final rule, the FAA acknowledged that it could not sat-
isfy every stakeholder, but it formulated a rule that best struck a
balance between the competing interests. 34 9 The FAA believes
that the DC SFRA final rule achieves the agency's objectives us-
ing the least burdensome means. 5 o
V. ENFORCING SAFETY REGULATIONS
A robust compliance and enforcement program is vital to the
FAA's ability to carry out its central mission to promote safety in
civil aviation."' The process of enforcing the FAA's safety rules
is not immune to the complexities and challenges presented by
different stakeholder interests. As with rulemaking and airspace
management, the FAA must consider a number of different in-
terests each time it pursues an enforcement action.
There are several key objectives for the agency's compliance
and enforcement program: (1) protect the public; (2) promote
safety and compliance with statutory and regulatory require-
ments; (3) correct ongoing noncompliance; (4) deter future
noncompliance; (5) punish aberrant behavior; and (6) take re-
medial action when necessary.5 2 The FAA has broad statutory
authority to carry out these objectives as they relate to its respon-
sibilities and powers concerning safety in air commerce. 53 This
authority has equipped the FAA with a wide range of options for
addressing noncompliance with safety rules, including adminis-
trative action, civil penalties, certificate suspensions for a fixed
period of time, indefinite certificate suspensions pending com-
346 Id.
34 Id. at 76,205.
34 Id.
39 See id. at 76,201.
350 See id.
35 FAA, ORDER 2150.3B, FAA COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, ch. 2,
at 1-3 (Oct. 1, 2007) [hereinafter FAA ORDER 2150.3B].
352 See id. ch. 2, at 1-3.
3 Id. ch. 2, at 1.
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pliance or demonstration of qualifications, and certificate revo-
cations. 5 The FAA must take the action most appropriate to
promote safety and compliance with the regulations and must
do so in a manner that is fair and reasonable. 5 5 A number of
different factors must be considered and weighed in making this
determination. 6
Using the following scenario as a guide, this section will dis-
cuss the FAA's attempts to balance its mission to promote avia-
tion safety with competing public priorities and stakeholder
interests in carrying out its compliance and enforcement
program.
The FAA discovers an unsafe condition on a specific model of
aircraft. The agency issues an Airworthiness Directive (AD) re-
quiring the air carriers that use that model of aircraft to per-
form immediate corrective maintenance to remedy the
condition. An AD has the force and effect of a regulation.
One air carrier that uses the aircraft referenced in the AD de-
cides to delay compliance and, instead of immediately carrying
out the corrective maintenance as required, continues to oper-
ate revenue flights.
A. STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR INTERESTS
In the scenario presented above, air carriers form the group
with the most obvious interest in the FAA's compliance and en-
forcement policy and process. But they are not the only group
with interests that the FAA must consider and attempt to bal-
ance when taking enforcement action. The traveling public, air
carrier employees, airports, and other governmental entities all
have an interest in how the FAA enforces its regulations. These
interests, although varied, can be separated into two main cate-
gories: safety interests and economic interests.
Like the FAA, each of these stakeholder groups places a prior-
ity on safety. 58 Passengers expect that the FAA will vigorously
34 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40113(a) (2006) (authorizing the issuance of orders);
§ 44709(b) (authorizing orders modifying, amending, suspending, or revoking
certificates); § 46301 (a) (1) (authorizing the imposition of civil penalties); see also
FAA ORDER 2150.3B, supra note 351, ch. 2, at 1-3.
35 FAA ORDER 2150.3B, supra note 351, ch. 2, at 1, 3.
36 See id. ch. 7, at 4-9.
357 14 C.F.R. § 39.3 (2010).
358 Each of the primary industry advocacy groups lists safety as a top priority or
as a key component of its mission statement. See, e.g., About ATA, AIR TRANsp.
Ass'N, http://www.airlines.org/About/AboutATA/Pages/aboutata.aspx (last vis-
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enforce its regulations to keep them safe when they fly.35 9 Carri-
ers expect that the FAA will provide the guidance necessary for
them to understand the regulations they are subject to and their
responsibilities under those regulations.3 6 0 They have an inter-
est in compliance, not only to avoid penalties imposed by the
agency, but also to protect their assets-employees and equip-
ment-and their customers. Carrier employees expect that the
FAA will focus its enforcement efforts on those regulations de-
signed to keep them safe while they work so that they, in turn,
can provide safe transportation for their passengers. 61 Airports
expect that the FAA will actively enforce the regulations that are
designed to ensure safe and smooth operations.3 6 2 Other gov-
ernmental entities, including Congress, the White House, and
state and local governments expect that the agency will promote
compliance and accountability through its enforcement pro-
gram to maximize safety and prevent incidents and accidents.363
Although the enhancement of aviation safety is of paramount
importance for all stakeholders, there are significant economic
interests that the FAA must consider in its enforcement deci-
sion-making. For passengers, these economic interests can be
summed up in three words: accessibility, cost, and choice. 64
Passengers want continued access to air transportation and
ited Sept. 19, 2010); Global Safety Network, AIRPORTS COUNCIL INT'L, http://
www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/acicontent7-cjsp?zn=aci&
cp=1-4613-8452-8472_6662 (last visited Sept. 12, 2010); Mission Statement, AIR
LINE PILOTs Ass'N, http://www.alpa.org/Home/WhoWeAre/MissionStatement/
tabid/2237/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
359 See INDEP. REVIEW TEAM, MANAGING RisKS IN CIVIL AVIATION: A REVIEW OF
THE FAA's APPROACH TO SAFETv 36 (2008) [hereinafter MANAGING RISKS], availa-
ble at http://www.aci-na.org/static/entransit/irt-faa-safety_9-08.pdf.
160 See id. at 26-29 (discussing the AD process and the FAA's attempt to address
stakeholders' concerns regarding that process by forming a compliance review
team to evaluate the process and recommend ways in which to improve it); see
generally AD COMPLIANCE REVIEW TEAM, PROCESs REVIEW TECHNICAL REPORT (JUl.
8, 2009) (discussing the compliance review team's evaluation of the AD process
and its recommendations for improvements).
361 See Agenda, AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, http://airlines.org/Agenda/Pages/
ATAagenda.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
362 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (2006) (requiring the FAA to develop regulations
for the sale and efficient use of airspace).
363 See generally Aviation Safety: Oversight of FAA Safety Initiatives: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Sec. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
and Transp., 111th Cong. (2009); Critical Lapses in FAA Safety Oversight of Airlines:
Abuses of Regulatory "Partnership Programs": Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure, 110th Cong. (2008).
36 AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 6, at 5.
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have, perhaps, an even greater interest in being able to choose
among multiple carriers to reduce the cost of travel.36 ' Airports
have similar interests in accessibility and choice among carriers
to remain competitive and maintain revenue. Carriers have an
interest in minimizing costs, maximizing profits for their share-
holders, and maintaining a competitive advantage over their
peers. 66 Air transportation is a multi-billion dollar industry.6 7
Air carriers employ thousands of people and are a significant
source of tax revenue."' While carrier employees have a per-
sonal economic interest in the financial health of the industry,
which provides them with income and continued employment,
other branches of government have a substantial interest in the
economic viability of the industry as it relates to the national
and local economies.
B. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
How does the FAA find the appropriate balance between
safety and economic interests in its enforcement process? "The
initial priority" in any FAA enforcement action "is to correct
ongoing noncompliance."36' The ongoing noncompliance to
be addressed in the scenario presented above is the carrier's fail-
ure to perform corrective maintenance in accordance with an
AD. The FAA must determine the type of enforcement action
that is most appropriate to correct the carrier's noncompliance,
promote safety, and encourage future compliance with the
regulations.'o
Unlike its rulemaking process, the FAA's enforcement process
does not attempt to balance each and every one of the individ-
ual stakeholder interests discussed above. Rather, it seeks to
find the most appropriate way to address safety concerns, while
- See id.
66 See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILYTY OFFICE, GAO 04-836, COMMERCIAL Avi-
ATION: LEGACY AIRLINES MUST FURTHER REDUCE COSTS TO RESTORE PROFITABILITY
2-6 (2004).
367 See ADMINISTRATOR'S FACT BOOK, supra note 37, at 21.
368 See May 2008 National Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Esti-
mates: NAICS 481100 - Scheduled Air Transportation, BUREAU OF LABOR & STATIS-
TICS, http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_481100.htm (last updated May 4,
2009). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in May 2009 approximately
425,470 people were employed in occupations related to scheduled air transpor-
tation. Id.
369 FAA ORDER 2150.3B, supra note 351, ch. 2, at 1.
370 Id.
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minimizing the adverse economic impact on the public.17' The
first step in this balancing act is to identify and evaluate the con-
duct involved.3 7 2 Which rules were violated? What is the risk to
aviation safety? Does the carrier's conduct demonstrate a lack
of qualification or competence to hold an operating certificate?
Are the aircraft involved in a safe condition for operation? In
the above scenario, the carrier has failed to comply with an AD.
The danger presented by that conduct is high: failure to correct
the unsafe condition identified in an AD could lead to the fail-
ure of an aircraft system or component that is critical to safe
flight. Continued operation of the aircraft presents a serious
risk to passengers, crew, and persons on the ground.
The second step in the analysis is to determine the most ap-
propriate enforcement action based on what safety and the pub-
lic interest require. 7 3 Most enforcement actions against air
carriers are civil penalty actions, due in large part to the eco-
nomic consequences and adverse impact on the public that
would result from the suspension or revocation of an air car-
rier's operating certificate and the cessation of that carrier's op-
erations.3 7 4 Delays and disruptions cost money. Cessation of air
carrier operations, whether temporary or permanent, causes sig-
nificant disruption to passengers and, ultimately, can result in
significant job losses and the loss of air transportation service to
a particular airport or geographic area. There are also corre-
sponding losses in revenue to airports and other governmental
entities. Nevertheless, if the carrier's conduct demonstrates a
lack of qualification or competence to hold an operating certifi-
cate, the FAA will not hesitate to take enforcement actions to
suspend or revoke that certificate for remedial purposes.7 5 The
FAA will also take the more moderate action to "ground" air-
craft operated by an air carrier if there is reason to believe that
they are not in a safe condition for operation.7 6
Generally, the FAA does not take punitive certificate action (a
suspension for a fixed period of time) and civil penalty action
371 See id. ch. 7, at 1.
372 See id. ch. 7, at 4-5.
37s The FAA has created a table of recommended sanctions to assist in this
process. Id. app. B.
74 See id. ch. 7, at 1, 8.
37 Id. ch. 7, at 1-4.
376 See 49 U.S.C. § 44709(b) (2006) (authorizing the suspension or revocation
of airworthiness certificates issued under § 44704); see also MANAGING RISKS, supra
note 359, at 28-29 (recommending that the FAA retain the authority to ground
any aircraft for non-compliance with an AD).
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against a certificate holder for the same conduct.3 7 7 The FAA
will, however, take remedial certificate action and punitive ac-
tions in the same case when warranted.7 In the scenario men-
tioned above, the FAA could engage in a two-part approach
involving remedial certificate action and civil penalty action.
First, to correct the ongoing noncompliance quickly, the FAA
could issue an emergency order to immediately suspend the air-
worthiness certificates of the aircraft involved and ground those
aircraft until the carrier demonstrates compliance with the
AD.'" Second, to address the objectives of punishment and de-
terrence, among others, the FAA could impose a civil penalty for
the carrier's operation of the aircraft at issue while those aircraft
were in an unsafe condition. 8 o
When the FAA elects to impose a civil penalty, there are a
number of different factors that must be considered.38 1 A civil
penalty must reflect the severity of the violation, provide a suffi-
cient measure of punishment for the conduct, and serve to de-
ter the carrier from violating the regulations in the future.3 8 2 It
should also be used to ensure a level economic playing field for
similarly situated air carriers." Civil penalties must be substan-
tial enough to remove any profit incentive for noncompliance,
and the amount must not be mitigated based on corrective ac-
tion that merely brings the carrier into compliance. 38 4 To do so
would create an economic disadvantage for those carriers that
have expended the resources necessary to maintain compli-
ance.3 8 5 For example, an air carrier could decide to delay com-
pliance with an AD that affects all, or a substantial portion, of its
fleet because it is too costly to remove aircraft from service to
complete the required maintenance. The FAA must act to ad-
dress this noncompliance, not only for safety and accident
avoidance purposes, but also to ensure that noncompliant carri-
ers are not permitted to undermine the economic viability of
377 FAA ORDER 2150.3B, supra note 351, ch. 7, at 10.
378 Id.
37 49 U.S.C. § 44709(e) (2) (authorizing the issuance of emergency orders
when the FAA Administrator determines that an emergency exists and that safety
in air transportation requires that the order be effective immediately).
o See FAA ORDER 2150.3B, supra note 351, ch. 5, at 16.
38 Id. ch. 7, at 4-9.
382 Id. ch. 7, at 4-6.
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those carriers that do comply with the regulations. 8 6 To remain
compliant, all carriers subject to the regulation must incur the
cost of the regulation.
When the agency promulgates a regulation, it establishes the
minimum standard.3 8 8 The FAA must consider the economic
impact of the rule and attempt to use the least burdensome
means to achieve that minimum level of safety.3 8 ' The FAA also
strives to achieve relative consistency in the sanctions im-
posed.9 o It "pursues this objective to assure fairness and so the
sanction's impact has an equivalent degree of deterrent or disci-
plinary value to others similarly situated."3 9 1
Although the primary focus of the FAA's enforcement deci-
sion-making process is to maximize safety, the FAA does con-
sider individual interests and circumstances to some extent in
determining the amount of a civil penalty. 3 9 2 For example, the
maximum civil penalties for large and small business concerns
authorized under 49 U.S.C. § 46301 are different.3 9 3 This allows
the FAA to consider the size and financial strength of an air
carrier in determining the appropriate sanction amount.39 4 The
FAA also considers the effect that a civil penalty will have on a
carrier's ability to continue business.3 " The prospect of putting
a carrier out of business, however, does not outweigh the FAA's
obligation to take the enforcement action that safety requires.
Other factors that the FAA may consider in determining the
sanction amount are the carrier's level of experience, violation
history, whether the violation was intentional or deliberate, and
386 See id.
387 See id.
88 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (2006).
9 DEP'T OF TRANSP., REVISED DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE: TREATMENT OF THE
VALUE OF PREVENTING FATALITIES AND INJURIES IN PREPARING ECONOMic ANALYSES
1 (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/regulations-policies/policy-gui-
dance/benefit cost/media/Revised%20Value%200f%2OLife%20Guidance%20
Feburary%202008.pdf. Part of determining the economic impact is determining
the value of a life saved by a regulation. Currently, the DOT uses $5.8 million as
the value of a statistical life saved when assessing the value of preventing fatalities.
Id.
3o FAA ORDER 2150.3B, supra note 351, ch. 7, at 8.
391 Id.
392 Id.
3 49 U.S.C. § 46301 (a) (setting the maximum penalty for a large business at
$25,000 and for a small business at either $1,100 or $11,000 (adjusted for infla-
tion), depending on the regulation violated).




whether the violation was reported voluntarily.9 6 Carriers en-
gaged in air transportation are held to the highest level of
safety.397 Intentional or deliberate violations can justify aggra-
vating the sanction amount up to the statutory maximum."' A
violation history can justify aggravating the sanction amount and
can also justify the imposition of a punitive suspension of the
carrier's operating certificate, or if the pattern of violations re-
flects a lack of qualification, revocation of the carrier's operat-
ing certificate."9 On the other hand, even outside the agency's
formal voluntary disclosure programs, the FAA may mitigate the
sanction for a carrier that reports a violation voluntarily before
the FAA discovers it, takes immediate action to correct the non-
compliance, and works with the FAA to prevent future
violations.4 0 0
In deciding whether to take enforcement action, the FAA
must attempt to balance its primary safety interest with the eco-
nomic interests of the public at large. Although the focus of the
FAA's enforcement policy and process is not the balancing of
each and every individual stakeholder interest, there are several
factors that the FAA considers in determining the appropriate
enforcement action and the resulting sanction for regulatory vi-
olations. Ideally, appropriate and careful consideration of these
factors will result in an enforcement action and sanction that
satisfies the goals and objectives of the compliance and enforce-
ment program and will enable the FAA to fulfill its obligation to
do what safety and the public interest require.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 2008, the FAA celebrated its fiftieth anniversary during the
safest period in aviation history. After World War II, there were
396 Id. ch. 7, at 5, 7-8.
397 Id. at 7.
398 Id. ch. 7, at 5; see alo id. ch. 7, at 9-10 (regarding the use of the sanctions
table).
3- Id. ch. 7, at 7.
400 Id. ch. 7, at 8. The FAA has developed and implemented voluntary disclo-
sure programs "to improve compliance and increase safety by offering incentives
to regulated persons to disclose their own violations, other safety discrepancies,
and general safety information to the FAA and take corrective action to preclude
future safety problems, if appropriate." Id. ch. 2, at 6; see also MANAGING RiSKS,
supra note 359, at 29-35 (discussing voluntary disclosure programs and recom-
mending that the FAA retain such programs as "vitally important to the future of
aviation safety" because they provide a vehicle for identifying and mitigating
risks).
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more than 1,300 fatalities per one hundred million passen-
gers.4 0 1 From 2003 to 2007, the average rate of fatalities was 2.5
per one hundred million passengers.4 0 2 This dramatic improve-
ment in safety is a credit to the FAA's commitment to its mis-
sion. Today's aviation transportation system is a safe and
efficient system. However, the FAA has not lost sight of its mis-
sion and continues to implement ways to enhance safety and
efficiency. 403 The FAA recognizes that the low-hanging fruit has
been plucked, and that the incremental enhancements often re-
sult in substantial costs and burdens to stakeholders.
The next fifty years will bring many changes to aviation, and
the FAA is prepared for them. If enacted, the Reauthorization
Bill currently before Congress will set a number of new priorities
for the agency. 404 Recently, Congress separated several key
safety initiatives from the Reauthorization Bill and passed them
as part of an authorization extension.405 The FAA is working to
address these initiatives expeditiously in addition to its other
safety priorities. The FAA is laboring to make a giant leap for-
ward in air traffic management with the implementation of
NextGen over the coming decade.406 The FAA also has opportu-
nities to address new areas of development in unmanned aerial
systems407 and commercial space transportation. 4 0 8 The FAA
will continue to address today's challenges, including reducing
congestion on the ground and in the airspace and improving
401 MANAGING RIsKs, supra note 359, at 13.
402 Id.
403 E.g., Press Release, FAA, FAA Proposes Sweeping New Rule to Fight Pilot
Fatigue (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.faa.gov/news/press-releases/
news story.cfm?newsid=1 1839.
404 Aviation Safety and Investment Act of 2010, H.R. 1586, 111th Cong. (House
Amendment to Senate Amendment, Mar. 25, 2010).
05 Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2348. These safety initiatives include flight
crewmember mentoring, flight crewmember and dispatcher training, mitigating
pilot fatigue, safety management systems for air carriers, and improving airline
transport pilot certification. See id.
406 See FAA, FAA's NEXTGEN IMPLEMENTATION PIAN 4 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/nextgen/media/ngip3-2010.pdf.
-7 See Press Release, FAA, Fact Sheet-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Sept. 10,
2010), available at http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/news-story.cfm?newsid
=6287.
408 See FAA, COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION FiscAL YEAR 2010 BUSINESS
PLAN 1 (2009), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/plans-reports/media/AST
%20Business%20Plan%20with%20cover.pdf.
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safety for the traveling public.'"0 Each of these initiatives will
involve a variety of competing interests and long-term conse-
quences that the FAA must consider. New rulemaking activities
also will increase the responsibilities for the agency to enforce
those rules and consider the consequences of those enforce-
ment actions. The FAA is ready to navigate the turbulence of
this next frontier.
4 See Press Release, FAA, Fact Sheet-A System Under Stress: Aviation Con-
gestion (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/
news-story.cfm?newsid=8807.
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